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Background: The Swedish government has increasingly begun to rely on so called informative governance when
regulating healthcare. The question this article sets out to answer is: considered to be “the backbone” of the
Swedish state’s strategy for informative governance in healthcare, what kind of regulatory arrangement is the
evidence-based National Guidelines? Together with national medical registries and an extensive system of quality
and efficiency indicators, the National Guidelines constitutes Sweden’s quality management system.
Methods: A framework for evaluating and comparing regulatory arrangements was used. It asks for instance: what
is the purpose of the regulation and are regulation methods oriented towards deterrence or compliance?
Results: The Swedish National Guidelines is a regulatory arrangement intended to govern the prioritizations of all
decision makers – politicians and administrators in the self-governing county councils as well as healthcare
professionals – through a compliance model backed up by top-down benchmarking and built-in mechanisms for
monitoring. It is thus an instrument for the central state to steer local political authorities. The purpose is to achieve
equitable and cost-effective healthcare.
Conclusions: This article suggests that the use of evidence-based guidelines in Swedish healthcare should be seen
in the light of Sweden’s constitutional setting, with several autonomous levels of political authority negotiating the
scope for their decision-making power. As decision-making capacity is relocated to the central government – from
the democratically elected county councils responsible for financing and provision of healthcare – the Swedish
National Guidelines is part of an ongoing process of healthcare recentralization in Sweden, reducing the scope for
local decision-making. This represents a new aspect of evidence-based medicine (EBM) and clinical practice
guidelines (CPGs).
Keywords: Evidence-based guidelines, National guidelines, Governance, Healthcare regulation, Recentralization,
Sweden, Equity, Cost-effectiveness, PrioritizationsBackground
Evidence-based medicine (EBM) has become an essential
part of medical decision-making. Clinical practice guide-
lines (CPGs), and similar systematic approaches to speci-
fying “best practices”, are at present the primary method
for implementing EBM in healthcare practice [1]. CPGs
are generally defined in terms of quality and efficiency im-
provement and thought to help practitioners and patients
make informed decisions about appropriate healthcare for
specific clinical circumstances [2]. EBM and CPGs are also
part of health policy [3-5], and inversely, there is a* Correspondence: mio.fredriksson@pubcare.uu.se
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article, unless otherwise stated.progress towards evidence-based policymaking. In this art-
icle we take a closer look at governmental use of CPGs,
more specifically how Swedish National Guidelines is used
as one of the national state’s instruments for governing
healthcare [6]. We show that the regulatory design of the
Swedish National Guidelines allows for central control of
local political and clinical decision-making, thus limiting
the scope for decentralized healthcare.
Although the development of CPGs started out as an
intra-professional endeavor [7], and in many respects
still is, other actors are today involved in the production
of CPGs. The best known European example is the
National Institute for Health and Care Excellence (NICE),
an “independent organisation responsible for developingtral Ltd. This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the
/creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0), which permits unrestricted use,
, provided the original work is properly credited. The Creative Commons Public
mons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/) applies to the data made available in this
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ing high-quality health and social care, and preventing
and treating ill health” in the UK [8]. In Sweden, a govern-
ment agency – the National Board of Health and Welfare
(NBHW) – develops so called National guidelines for
healthcare; evidence-based decision supports that consist
of recommendations for prevention, diagnosis and treat-
ment of diseases that affect large numbers of patients and
are costly to society. The National guidelines are consid-
ered “the backbone” of the state’s strategy for informative
governance in healthcare, which also comprises e.g. the
National Quality Registries, the Regional Comparisons of
Quality and Efficiency in Swedish Health Care, the web-
based health library for health professionals, and system-
atic knowledge reviews produced by government agencies.
Informative governance is a system that seeks to increase
the extent of evidence-based practice [9] through the de-
veloping, dissemination and implementation of best avail-
able knowledge to achieve the best possible benefit to
users and patients [10]. It differs from EBM as it includes
activities to create and maintain structures and processes
that lead to the use of best available knowledge when
making clinical and administrative decisions [11]. Struc-
tures (such as collaborative forums for the government
agencies involved in informative governance) and pro-
cesses created to develop and implement guidelines are
central to the Swedish state’s informative governance
strategy, but it also includes e.g. support for long-term
knowledge development in the health service and at the
Universities, and systems for the monitoring and public
presentation of results from the health service. The Swedish
government is increasingly relying on informative govern-
ance in governing and regulating healthcare, alongside le-
gislation, supervision, economic incentives, agreements,
monitoring and evaluation [12]. Several government agen-
cies have recently intensified its informative governance ap-
proach [10]. The approach is akin to clinical governance,
first used by the UK department of health [13].
Healthcare being a complex field of services, govern-
ments today control producers and professionals through
a multitude of regulatory arrangements with varying force
or capacity. How evidence-based guidelines fit into this
variety of regulatory arrangements is a question that de-
serves more attention, not least because governance based
on EBM may have a direct impact on patients’ health and
quality of life. Informative governance in Sweden is not
intended to replace other forms of governance, which im-
plies governmental control based on EBM has some
unique governing functions or features. This leads to
questions about who is to be governed, in what way, and
why; questions that fundamentally concern the design of
the regulatory arrangement.
Thus, in the present article we use a framework for
evaluating and comparing regulatory arrangements tomake an analysis of the Swedish National guidelines
[14]. In essence, the question this article sets out to an-
swer is: considered to be “the backbone” of the state’s
strategy for informative governance, what kind of regula-
tory arrangement is the Swedish National Guidelines?
For instance, what is the purpose of the regulation, what
organizations and activities are subject to regulation, are
regulation methods oriented towards deterrence or com-
pliance, and what methods are used for monitoring com-
pliance? These questions are asked within the context of
a decentralized healthcare system where the responsibil-
ities for healthcare are divided between three different
governing levels: the central state, county councils/regions
(both of which are referred to as county councils in the
article) and municipalities. The state is responsible for
overall health care policies whereas the 21 county councils
are responsible for the funding and delivery of healthcare
and the 290 municipalities are responsible for care for the
elderly and the disabled, as well as long-term psychiatric
care.Method
In this article we use a framework for evaluating and com-
paring regulatory arrangements elaborated by Walshe and
Shortell [14]. It is based on seven main areas for evalu-
ation, see Table 1. It can be used both for conceptual eval-
uations or to develop more quantitative measures.
By making a qualitative document analysis, we investi-
gate how the idea and intent of the Swedish National
Guidelines is expressed in public documents and infor-
mation material emanating from the National Board of
Health and Welfare (NBHW), the Government and the
state administration. Qualitative document analysis is a
systematic procedure used for making empirical observa-
tions based on written records [15]. In the public docu-
ments we have searched answers to the seven questions in
Walshe and Shortells’ model. The final analysis is based
on 25 documents, indicated by superscript figures in the
text, and listed in Additional file 1. Most important are
two different documents from the NBHW describing de-
velopment and intent 1,7 and the information material pre-
sented at the website of NBHW (www.socialstyrelsen.se).
As mentioned, several Swedish government agencies op-
erating within the field of healthcare are involved in in-
formative governance. The National Board of Health and
Welfare is, however, solely responsible for the develop-
ment of National guidelines, see Table 2. Thus, the article
does not address the activities of agencies such as the
Dental and Pharmaceutical Benefits Agency (the TLV) that
determines whether a pharmaceutical product or dental
care procedure is subsidized by the state, or the Swedish
Council on Health Technology Assessment (SBU). SBU’s
assessments of health care interventions are however
Table 1 Framework for evaluating regulation
Characteristic Questions Concerns
Regulating organization What kind of organization takes on the role of regulator? Constitution, formal mandate, reporting or
accountability arrangements etc.
Regulatory goal/objectives What is the purpose of regulation and how explicitly it is stated? The range of problems or needs addressed
Scope of regulation What organizations and activities are subject to regulation? Forms or types of organization (horizontal scope)
Which of their functions or activities (vertical scope)
Regulatory model Are regulation methods oriented towards deterrence or
compliance?
Deterrence: distant, formal adversarial relations,
formal sanctions and penalties
Compliance: close, friendly relationships, support,
educational activities etc.
Regulatory direction How are regulatory requirements communicated? Written standards, guidance on implementation etc.
Regulatory detection What methods are used for monitoring compliance? Surveys, inspections, data sources, follow-ups etc.
Regulatory enforcement What methods are used for enforcement? Disclosure of findings, incentives, sanctions,
financial penalties etc.
Source: Walshe K. Regulating healthcare - A prescription for improvement? Maidenhead: Open University Press; 2003. For clarification purposes some adjustments
of Walshe and Shortells’ original model have been made, but no changes of model content.
Fredriksson et al. BMC Health Services Research 2014, 14:509 Page 3 of 9
http://www.biomedcentral.com/1472-6963/14/509important sources of information when the NBHW de-
velops National Guidelines.
Ethics statement
No ethics approval was needed according to the Declar-
ation of Helsinki as the study does not involve human
subjects, or identifiable human material and data.
Results
Regulating organization
The NBHW – a government agency under the jurisdic-
tion of the Ministry of Health and Social Affairs – is
today commissioned by the government to develop andTable 2 Swedish National Guidelines autumn 2014
Published guidelines • National Guidelines for the Treatmen
• National Guidelines for Antipsychotic
• National Guidelines for Palliative care
• National Guidelines for Musculoskele
• National Guidelines for Methods of P
• National Guidelines for Adult Dental
• National Guidelines for Lung Cancer
• National Guidelines for Psychosocial
• National Guidelines for Care in cases
• National Guidelines for Care in cases
• National Guidelines for Stroke Care (
Preliminary guidelines • National guidelines for Diabetes Care
• National guidelines for Substance Ab
Updates and new guidelines • National guidelines for Asthma and C
• National guidelines for Cardiac Care
• National guidelines for Multiple scler
Table explanation. The numbers (1–6) refer to implementation facilitators accessible
facilitators: 1. Indicators, 2. Target levels, 3. Patient version of guideline, 4. Implemen
Additional resources, e.g. professional views, survey material. Source: http://www.somonitor the Swedish National Guidelines as well as to
support implementation1. New guideline areas are some-
times a direct mandate from the government. The
NBHW’s governance mandate is different from that of
HTA organizations in Sweden, for instance the Swedish
Council on Health Technology Assessment (SBU). SBU is
involved in knowledge mediating processes (supporting the
recipient’s own knowledge formation); while the NBHW is
involved in strategic intervention processes (assessing
knowledge aiming to influence the recipient’s decisions)2.
Government agencies in Sweden are considered im-
portant actors in the process of transforming political
decisions into actual policy [16]. Key activities of thet of Breast, Prostate and Colorectal Cancers (1,2,5,6)





Care and Treatment (1,2,3,6)
Interventions for Schizophrenia or Schizophrenia-type Conditions (1,3,4,6)
of Dementia (1,3,4,6)
of Depression and Anxiety Disorders (1,3,4,6)
1,2,3,6)
(final version finished spring 2015)
use Treatment (final version finished spring 2015)
OPD (preliminary version finished autumn 2014)
(preliminary version finished spring 2015)
osis and Parkinson’s disease (preliminary version finished spring 2016)
at the website of the National Board of Health and Welfare. Implementation
tation support, e.g. web-based tutorial, 5. Interactive information material, 6.
cialstyrelsen.se (27-09-2014).
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healthcare and to develop standards and issue regula-
tion. Until June 2013 a key activity was also to supervise
the health and medical services and staff3 and the
NBHW then had the mandate to impose financial penal-
ties or prohibit providers’ activities4. Supervision is now
carried out by a separate agency, the Health and Social
Care Inspectorate. The government influences the gen-
eral direction of the activities of the NBHW through
yearly instructions on how the agency may use the re-
sources allocated to them by the parliament and what
goals the agency is to achieve. The NBHW make Annual
Reports to the Government. In the Annual Report from
2010, the National guidelines’ important function in
the welfare system is pointed out. At the first page the
Director General stated that “Equity in healthcare is a
momentous issue for the Swedish welfare state and one
of the issues the NBHW has explicitly pursued during
the year /…/ the National guidelines help to make
healthcare more equitable across the country”5.
The development of National guidelines – which we
will not describe in detail here – consists of six steps; se-
lection of guideline area, identification and scientific re-
view of so called condition-intervention pairs, ranking of
condition-intervention pairs, preliminary version of
guidelines, final version of guidelines, and lastly, measur-
ing and monitoring1. The development process is led by
professional project managers from the NBHW. It in-
volves multi-professional expertise appointed by the
NBHW, sometimes in collaboration with specialist asso-
ciations, and represents the whole chain of care1,6.
When developing National guidelines on heart disease,
the process involved physicians within the relevant spe-
cialties but also general practitioners, nurses, physiother-
apists, ethicists and health economists, see [17]. Thus,
multi-professional expertise is involved, but the develop-
ment process is set by the NBHW that is responsible for
the guideline content and recommendations, which must
be authorized by the Director General at the NBHW7.
The NBHW claims the legitimacy of National guidelines
is dependent on that the NBHW is perceived as a legitim-
ate regulator and that the engaged experts have a good
reputation1.
If professional associations produce care plans or guide-
lines, the NBHW claims that it is important that those
guidelines complement the Swedish National Guidelines
rather than compete with them8. When a National Guide-
line is published, it becomes the “gold standard” within
that disease group in Sweden. Thus, the NBHW has a su-
perior position as guideline producer in Sweden.
Regulatory goal/objectives
In 1996, the NBHW was first assigned to develop
National guidelines for Swedish healthcare, at that timecalled National healthcare programs. Variations in medical
praxis were considered unsatisfactory both from a re-
source point of view, and in light of the equity-objective of
“good healthcare on equal terms” stated in the Swedish
Health and Medical Services Act (1982:763). National
healthcare programs were considered a way to strengthen
patients’ possibilities of receiving equivalent and evidence-
based healthcare throughout Sweden9. Fifteen years later
the goals are largely the same, except from the new em-
phasis on prioritizations (see Scope of regulation).
In the studied documents, it is possible to find several
formulations about objectives. At the website, the
NBHW states that the National guidelines will “contrib-
ute to strengthening the possibilities for the people to
receive equal and good healthcare”10,12. Such a formula-
tion corresponds directly to the national Health and
Medical Services Act (1982:763) establishing that “the
goal of all healthcare services is good health and health-
care on equal terms for the entire population”. Accord-
ing to the NBHW, evidence is a prerequisite for
achieving good healthcare, and the agency establishes
that informative governance will lead to more equivalent
healthcare provision regardless of where in Sweden one
lives and seeks care8. Thus, the National guidelines are
intended to “even out geographical differences in the
quality of care”11.
Effective use of healthcare resources is another clearly
pronounced objective of the National guidelines. The
NBHW establishes that Swedish National Guidelines are
intended to support the production of “cost-effective
healthcare that puts patient benefit first”1 also consider-
ing “the needs of the population so that resources
achieve the maximum possible benefit”13. It is thus a
combination of the point of view of the patient and the
community. In Swedish regulation, the objective of cost-
effectiveness is most clearly formulated in the ethical
platform established by the Parliament in 1997 (see
Scope of regulation), which stipulates that, when choos-
ing between treatments or interventions, there should be
a reasonable relationship between costs and effectiveness
in terms of health and quality of life. Cost-effectiveness
is thus an ethical principle and healthcare professionals
and principals are obliged to use resources to achieve
the best effect – anything else is considered unethical.
However, saving money is not an explicit goal of the
Swedish National Guidelines compared to, for instance,
NICE clinical guidelines that provides cost saving guid-
ance [18].
Scope of regulation
Making priorities – the vertical scope
According to the NBHW, the Swedish National Guide-
lines are intended as a support for prioritizations and
decision-making on how to allocate resources within
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National Guidelines is the NBHW’s primary way of
working with prioritizations, and of implementing the
national model for prioritizations established by the par-
liament in 199714,15,16.
Today, each National guideline contains a number of
recommendations with an established degree of priority
(from 1–10), crucial for decision-making and prioritization.
Simply put, an intervention with priority 1 is always a
higher priority than an intervention with priority 2 or 3,
and should accordingly be allocated more resources. This
applies to political decision-makers as well as to health
professionals, as we show in the next section. For example,
in the National Guidelines for Stroke Care (2009), one of
the recommendations (priority 1) is that the health service
shall promote the immediate diagnosis and treatment of
patients suffering from a suspected TIA (transient ischemic
attack) at emergency wards by physicians specializing in
strokes17. The ranking of recommendations draws on
the identification and scientific review of so-called
condition-intervention pairs, (e.g. 164 pairs in the
National Guidelines for Stroke Care mentioned above).
The degree of priority is then determined by combining
the severity of the condition, the effects of the interven-
tion and cost-effectiveness of the intervention (often
expressed as QALYs). The scientific strength of the evi-
dence for effects and cost-effectiveness is also included
in the ranking, as are ethical concerns. The leading idea
behind the ranking is that highly ranked interventions
shall receive a large part of the resources, whereas low
ranking interventions shall receive a small part. As an
example, highly ranked condition-intervention pairs are
often of great benefit to patients and cost-effective for
society. Condition-intervention pairs with an inad-
equate scientific base are low ranking1.
A decision-support for all decision-makers – the horizontal
scope
Politicians, leading administrators, healthcare managers
and healthcare professionals are the target groups that
are intended to use the Swedish National Guidelines18.
The opinion of the NBHW is that decision-makers must
take a standpoint on how to allocate resources within
and between different areas of the healthcare system10.
More explicitly, the Swedish National Guidelines can be
used for 1) decisions on resource allocation within and be-
tween different groups and treatment areas, 2) decisions
on management and organizational planning, 3) decisions
on local and regional healthcare programs and 4) individ-
ual decisions made by physicians meeting individual pa-
tients18. Hence, both horizontal prioritizations (political
priorities between disease groups) and vertical prioritiza-
tions (medical priorities within a disease group) are the
scope. The intended use for political or administrativedecisions is, however, more emphasized in the studied
documents than is clinical use. It is specifically mentioned
in the final guideline documents that the guideline recom-
mendations are intended to support decisions at the group
level e.g., 17. In comparison, the NICE clinical guidelines
aims “to help patients to make informed decisions” and to
“improve communication between patient and health pro-
fessional” [19].
Thus, the guideline recommendations are intended to
serve as a basis for politicians and health directors when
they are making decisions about resource allocation as
well as organization and competence improvement19. In
fact the NBHW encourages a development toward closer
integration of the Swedish National Guidelines into
budgetary processes in county councils16. Some recom-
mendations are calculated to have structural conse-
quences, such as regarding the need for new medical
skills or new medical equipment. Such changes often in-
volve major reallocation of resources and allocation of
additional resources, which must be decided by local polit-
ical government19,20,7. In the TIA-example mentioned
earlier, the NBHW made the assessment that implementa-
tion will increase the pressure on emergency wards and
increase the number of hospital beds needed, which ini-
tially will lead to increased costs. The NBHW also calcu-
lated the need for supplementary training programs for
physicians. The guideline recommendations may thus free
up resources by limiting the practice of certain treatments,
but also require additional resources when introducing
new interventions1. For example, in the National
Guidelines for Stroke Care, the NBHW presents a sum-
mary including ten recommended interventions. Four
interventions imply cost savings and six interventions
are associated with cost increases, at least initially. Six
interventions involve no organizational impact, whereas
four interventions require organizational change17.
Regulatory model and regulatory direction
The regulatory model is consistent with the so called
compliance-model, which means the NBHW and the
county councils share important goals. For instance, the
regulator and regulated organizations share the objective
of “healthcare on equal terms” for the whole Swedish
population (Health and Medical Services Act 1982:763)
and provision of healthcare in accordance with “science
and proven experience” (Patient Safety Act 2010:659).
The compliance model is visible throughout the entire
guideline process involving health professionals in the
development stages, as well as the county councils in
the implementation. The preliminary guideline versions
are open for dialogue with decision makers, professions
and patient organizations and discussed at conferences,
seminars and hearings. The preliminary versions allow
the county councils to make their own organizational
Fredriksson et al. BMC Health Services Research 2014, 14:509 Page 6 of 9
http://www.biomedcentral.com/1472-6963/14/509and financial analyses of the guideline recommendations.
The NBHW take these analyses into consideration when
establishing the final guideline version1,6.
Mainly it is the county councils’ responsibility to imple-
ment the National guidelines, with support from the
NBHW. The structure for implementation differs between
the county councils, but implementation is a prioritized
issue. The county councils’ willingness to implement the
guidelines is reflected in their expressed need for an effect-
ive standard process for implementation2. The regulatory
requirements are communicated openly by publishing all
documents related to the final guideline versions21.
Regulatory detection and regulatory enforcement
Guideline-specific sets of quality indicators for the most
important recommendations are crucial for monitoring
and follow-ups. The NBHW consider these quality indica-
tors a necessary condition for efficient informative govern-
ance22. Parallel to the guideline development process an
expert group develops quality indicators that are central
to decision-makers. In 2009 it was pointed out that, as far
as possible, guideline follow-ups shall be linked to medical
registry-data, e.g. the National Quality Registries (contains
personalized information about problems/diagnosis,
treatment, and results) and the Regional Comparisons
of Quality and Efficiency in Swedish Health Care8.
Monitoring and follow-ups are part of the regulatory
enforcement. The NBHW evaluates how National guide-
lines are used in the county councils and presents the
results openly23, which in practice create strong incentives
for implementing the National guidelines. For instance in
2011, the NBHW presented a National evaluation of
Stroke care, presenting the results of each county council
in comparison to the national average, at both county
council and hospital level25. The use of national quality-
indicators may be seen as top-down bench-marking as it
is “imposed from above” [20], i.e. established by the
NBHW rather than the county councils themselves. The
National guidelines are not legally binding but “strongly
directing”24. The NBHW emphasizes that all involved in
resource allocation, management and organizational plan-
ning as well as decisions about the treatment of individual
patients should have good knowledge of the content and
impact of the recommendations within the National
guidelines18. In practice, this is a strong incentive to follow
the recommendations.
Discussion
The findings from the previous analysis suggest that the
idea of the Swedish National Guidelines is to govern all
decision makers – politicians and administrators in the
county councils as well as healthcare professionals –
through a compliance model backed up by top-down
benchmarking and built-in mechanisms for monitoring.The purpose is to achieve equitable and cost-effective
healthcare in the whole country. One of the consequences,
however, is a weakening of local self-government.
The regulatory scope is what gives the Swedish National
Guidelines their capacity to influence decision making at
all levels involved in provision of healthcare. The scope of
regulation is both meso-level prioritizations (county coun-
cil politicians and administrators) and micro-level prioriti-
zations (healthcare professionals). Thus, apart from being
a channel for professional guidance, we find the Swedish
National Guidelines to be a regulatory arrangement mak-
ing it possible for the national state to govern local polit-
ical authorities and to take on a clearer role in assuring
care quality [21].
The National Guidelines are developed and imple-
mented in a healthcare system where responsibility for
healthcare is divided between three political levels of
government. All three levels of government are directly
elected every four years and self-governing with taxation
rights. From the early 1980s, the Swedish state has grad-
ually shifted powers and authority downwards to the
county councils and municipalities, building a strongly
decentralized healthcare system [22]. The combination
of locally elected political bodies and the possibility to
raise local taxes distinguishes Sweden from the more
centralized tax-based NHS [23]. As pointed out by, for
example, Saltman [24], decentralization in European
health systems has led to increased disparities in services
provided and heightened equity problems. Sweden is no
exception. Regional variations in healthcare utilization,
quality and outcomes have repeatedly been found in
national surveys, e.g. [16,25,26]. The 2013 Regional
Comparisons of Quality and Efficiency in Swedish
Health Care concludes that – although the majority of
the indicators show improvement over time – there are
variations between county councils, some of which are
significant; a fact that point to there being scope for
improvement of most of the 162 indicators. The re-
gional variations seen in Sweden are in part associated
with differences in the organization of healthcare pro-
duction across county councils [27]. On the one hand,
regional differences could be seen as a relevant adaptation
to local conditions [28], for example demographic struc-
ture and morbidity patterns. On the other hand, regional
differences could be seen as a possible threat to national
equity [29]. During the 2000s, the opinion that differences
between county councils might threaten the equity object-
ive has come to dominate the political debate in Sweden,
reflected in the National guidelines’ purpose of improving
equity in access to effective methods for treatment.
Vrangbæk [28] proposes that three functional areas in
healthcare can potentially range from being centralized
to decentralized; arranging/planning (i.e. the regulatory
function), financing and the delivery of healthcare
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Services Act (1982:763) as well as the Local Government
Act (1991:900), county councils have the mandate to allo-
cate resources and arrange services in order to “provide
good healthcare to their inhabitants”. Establishing recom-
mended interventions, the Swedish National Guidelines
thus reduce the county councils’ discretion to define what
good healthcare is and how to deliver it according to local
conditions and preferences, which involves the allocation
of resources. The Swedish National Guidelines may thus
be seen as an attempt to intervene in the decentralized re-
sponsibilities for healthcare.
The National Guidelines affect the power and respon-
sibility – linked to the range of decisions that can be
made locally– in all functional areas. As the Swedish
National Guidelines are part of an emerging centralized
regulatory framework defining e.g. quality and service
levels, the scope for local planning is curtailed. Further-
more, in practice, the Swedish National Guidelines also
curtail the scope for making autonomous service-
related decisions, by defining what technologies and
processes to use and how to organize delivery, e.g. how
to compose the workforce see [28]. In practice, the
Swedish National Guidelines also affect resource alloca-
tion through its recommendations, although the county
councils are still responsible for funding through local
taxation. Thus, we find the Swedish National Guide-
lines a power-transfer arrangement altering the balance
between national, regional and local levels of govern-
ment. In a broader perspective the Swedish National
Guidelines are part of a recentralization process already
seen in other Nordic countries [23] and in other welfare
sectors [30]. We thus suggest that the use of evidence-
based guidelines is a way to retake power decentralized
to the county councils the past 30 years, cf. [28]. Not to
forget, the National guidelines also influence micro-
level prioritizations made by health professionals. It has
been suggested that guidelines threaten professional au-
tonomy being an attempt to preset the actions of health
professionals [31]. Peckham et al., for instance,[32] see
changes in professional autonomy as directly linked to
degree of decentralization in health services, implying
that recentralization through National guidelines de-
creases professional autonomy.
The NBHW governs through a regulatory model ori-
ented towards compliance, i.e. cooperation and goal-
sharing between the regulator, the county councils,
health professionals and experts. As the regulatory ar-
rangement builds on compliance and cooperation, it is
reasonable to assume that the regulatory aspects may
not be as visible to those governed. The compliance
model requires that there is at least some degree of will-
ingness to implement the regulation, which in this spe-
cific case, can be linked to the guidelines’ perceivedlegitimacy. The cooperation strategy and the involve-
ment of representatives from the health service largely
contribute to the legitimacy (reducing affective barriers,
see below). For instance, it has been reported that ortho-
pedists consider it very important to comply with Na-
tional guidelines in contrast to “political reforms” such
as the Waiting-time guarantee [33]. Although the suc-
cessful implementation of guidelines is considered to im-
prove quality of care, it has been suggested that
guidelines have had limited effect on changing physician
behavior [34-36]. Barriers to guideline adherence have
been related to physician knowledge (cognitive barriers
such as lack of awareness and familiarity), attitude
(affective barriers such as lack of agreement with guide-
lines in general or specific guidelines, and lack of out-
come expectancy), and behavior (ability barriers such as
lack of time and resources and organizational con-
straints) [35]. There are examples of interventions that
have reduced barriers, e.g. [37], but several studies indicate
the need for improved adherence e.g. [38,39]. To enhance
implementation and adherence, the county councils have
expressed desire for a nationally consistent implementa-
tion process indicating they perceive National guidelines
as legitimate instruments for organizing provision at local
level.
The compliance model may be seen as a version of
consensus governance through soft-law practices, which
is relatively widespread in Swedish healthcare [30,40].
Soft-law refers to explicit but not legally binding rules
that are enforced by a variety of mechanisms, although
lacking formal sanctions. One of its advantages is that it
can allow for regulation where hard regulation would be
impossible [41], for instance in an area controlled by
strong professions and autonomous local governments
with responsibility for healthcare provision. Soft law is
often enforced through benchmarking, follow-ups and
evaluations. Similarly, the analysis shows that the com-
pliance model is complemented by an increasing reliance
on measurements, monitoring and follow-ups based on
quality indicators specifically tailored for each guideline.
These results are made public, creating pressure to com-
ply. Walshe and Shortell [14] point out that regulators
often use disclosure or publication of results as an en-
forcement strategy. As such, National Guidelines are
part of a multi-level approach of clinical governance
interlinking several data sources for national benchmark-
ing and quality control. The most explicit regulatory ob-
jectives are equitable distribution of quality healthcare
and cost-effectiveness in healthcare. Used for health pol-
icy purposes, CPGs are often associated with a fear of
rationalization and cost cutting [3,31]. However, cost-
effectiveness per se does not have anything to do with
saving money. A more expensive intervention may be
more cost-effective than a less expensive one. Thus,
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ing implies conscious limitations of the possibilities to
optimally meet needs for healthcare, for instance by lim-
iting supply (e.g. some conditions are excluded from
public financing or fewer treatment sessions are offered)
or by limiting quality (e.g. less expensive treatments or
medication are offered) [42]. As some of the National
guideline recommendations entail a need for additional
resources, it seems that it is not a regulatory arrange-
ment created for rationalization.
The results presented in the article are based on the
study of documents only, which is a potential limitation.
The documents contribute with information that ex-
presses the state’s and the government agencies’ official
approach – which is not necessarily equivalent to the ac-
tual practice of developing and implementing the National
Guidelines. Thus, the actual practice may differ from
the intent. Undoubtedly interviews would nuance the
NBHW’s role and its intentions with the National
guidelines, and also illustrate how local authorities and
health professionals perceive of the guidelines’ govern-
ing functions. Such interviews could also illustrate how
the development and implementation of the guidelines
is carried out at various levels of the health care system.
However, the aim of the study was to investigate what
kind of regulatory arrangement the Swedish National
Guidelines is (the idea and intent of the guidelines), not
to investigate the implementation process or outcomes.
Even so, quantitative data illustrating how the county
councils perform on some of the recommendations
presented in the guidelines, and whether differences be-
tween county councils have decreased since the guide-
lines were introduced, would point to the National
guidelines’ actual regulatory impact - which is lacking
in the current study. Using documents as the empirical
source is, however, also a strength as a longer period of
time can be accurately covered (in this case the devel-
opment of the regulatory arrangement from 1997 and
onwards), avoiding, for example, the recall bias associ-
ated with interviews. Another strength of the study is
the use of an analytical model – Walshe and Shortells’
framework [14] for evaluating and comparing regula-
tory arrangements. Advantages of using an analytic
model are that the analysis becomes more systematic
and transparent, and that it is easier to compare the in-
vestigated case with other cases and to make theoretical
connections and generalizations. Here, it enables com-
parisons with other types of regulation as well as with
other types of clinical practice guidelines throughout
the world.
Conclusions
International comparisons have established that there
is cross-country variation regarding the development,dissemination and implementation of CPGs [43]. The re-
sults presented here imply that Sweden, through its use of
CPGs, is departing from a governance model which gives
professional groups and local and regional authorities sub-
stantial autonomy in monitoring and improving their own
standards of practice [21]. We suggest that the use of
evidence-based guidelines in Swedish healthcare should
be seen in light of the constitutional setting, with several
autonomous levels of political authority that are con-
stantly negotiating the space for their decision-making
power. Thus, the Swedish case suggests that evidence-
based guidelines can be used to regulate intra-state
conditions, something that is normally not discussed in
the literature on EBM and CPGs. Thus, the article
makes its theoretical contributions at the intersection
of EBM, CPGs and healthcare regulation. However,
there is a lack of research on the effects of this specific
regulatory arrangement in Sweden. Next step would be
to study political and administrative use, for instance
the impact in budget processes at local level.
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